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Purpose of review: The COVID-19 pandemic poses a major global health threat. The rapid spread was facilitated
by air travel although rigorous travel bans and lockdowns were able to slow down the spread. How does COVID-19
compare with other emerging viral diseases of the past two decades?
Recent findings: Viral outbreaks differ in many ways, such as the individuals most at risk e.g. pregnant women for
Zika and the elderly for COVID-19, their vectors of transmission, their fatality rate, and their transmissibility often
measured as basic reproduction number. The risk of geographic spread via air travel differs significantly between
emerging infectious diseases.
Summary: COVID-19 is not associated with the highest case fatality rate compared with other emerging viral
diseases such as SARS and Ebola, but the combination of a high reproduction number, superspreading events and
a globally immunologically naïve population has led to the highest global number of deaths in the past 20 decade
compared to any other pandemic.
Keywords: SARS, Measles, Dengue, Zika, Chikungunya, Yellow fever, West Nile encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis,
Ebola, Monkeypox
Key points
1. Public health emergencies of international concern
in the past 20 years include COVID-19, poliomyel-
itis, H1N1, Ebola and Zika
2. COVID-19 is the worst pandemic in scale and
speed of this century associated with the highest
number of global deaths
3. Spread via air travel is most striking for respiratory
pathogens rather than vector-borne or other emer-
ging viruses
4. Combating COVID-19 will require an all-society
and all-government approach
Introduction
Emerging infectious disease outbreaks are most likely to
originate in wildlife, and are increasing significantly over
time correlated with socio-economic, environmental,
ecological factors combined with increasing mobility and
globalization [1, 2] including climate change [3, 4]. Viral
outbreaks differ in many ways, such as the individuals
most at risk e.g. pregnant women for Zika and the eld-
erly for COVID-19, their vectors of transmission, their
fatality rate, and their transmissibility often measured as
basic reproduction number. Despite these differences,
policy responses used to tackle viral epidemics have
tended to be similar across time and countries – social
distancing, quarantines, school closures [5], and
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information campaigns are the policy instruments nor-
mally available, in addition to vector control campaigns
for vector-borne viral diseases, personal protection, and
most importantly, vaccines. For diseases with high
potential of geographic spread associated with high case
fatalities, rigorous mobility and travel restrictions are be-
ing deployed [6]. This review examines emerging or re-
emerging viral infections of the past two decades, their
characteristics and the risk of geographic spread via air
travel.
Coronaviruses
The current pandemic is caused by a coronavirus of zoo-
notic origin -SARS-CoV-2-, that emerged in Wuhan,
China, by the end of 2019, and was rapidly declared a
public health emergency of international concern (PHEI
C). SARS-CoV-2 is most likely of bat origin, similar to
its predecessor SARS virus that caused the SARS out-
break in 2003 [7]. Live animal markets selling multiple
species of wild and domestic animals in proximity to
large populations of densely housed humans are thought
to be the source of both outbreaks [8]. The main trans-
mission route is via respiratory droplets, and the angio-
tensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2), found in the lower
respiratory tract of humans, has been identified as the
receptor used for cell entry for both SARS and SARS-
CoV-2 [9, 10]. The basic reproductive number R0 is 2–
3, indicating that every case leads to 2–3 secondary
cases), is similar or somewhat higher to that of SARS
[11]. R0 above 1 will lead to propagation and further
growth of the outbreak.
Risk factors for severe disease outcomes include older
age and co-morbidities. The higher asymptomatic rate,
further compounded by pre-symptomatic transmission
has made containment much harder for COVID-19 than
for SARS [8]. COVID-19 spread is facilitated by popula-
tion densities, urbanization, mass gatherings and super-
spreading events [12–15]..
The SARS epidemic in 2003 reported 8098 cases with
774 deaths, and was eventually brought under control by
July 2003, in a matter of 8 months [8]. By interrupting
all human-to-human transmission through aggressive
case detection, prompt isolation, contact tracing with
legal enforcement of quarantine, SARS was effectively
eradicated [8]. In contrast, by December 2020, SARS-
CoV-2 has caused more than 70 million infections with
more than 1.7 million deaths, in a matter of 12 months
with no sign of abating. Although lockdowns and unpre-
cedented travel restrictions were able to flatten the
curve, pre-mature re-opening led to resurgence in most
countries [16].
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) has plagued the Middle East since it was
first reported in 2012. MERS spread to 27 countries
across the globe, with more than 2274 cases with 842
case fatalities to date [17]. Similar to COVID-19, house-
hold transmission, transmission to health care workers
and clustering are common [18]. Cross-species transmis-
sion is the likely origin of this virus. Camels may act as a
direct source of human MERS-CoV infection [19]. The
case fatality rate of MERS (37%) is far higher than that
of COVID-19, yet, outbreaks were contained relatively
expediently as they were usually limited to hospital-
based outbreaks.
Geographic spread of coronaviruses via air travel
Prior to the lockdown in Wuhan, China, COVID-19 rap-
idly spread within China, and also globally following the
direction of connectivity and high air passenger volumes
[20, 21]. The epicenter from Wuhan quickly moved to
Iran, then Italy, and then all of Europe, followed by in-
creasingly bigger outbreaks in the United States, Brazil
and other countries in the Americas. Mass gathering
events and spread via returning travelers or pilgrims
triggered new outbreaks in various countries [22–24].
The vast majority of countries in the world now report
COVID-19 cases, although some countries have been
more successful than others in implementing public
health measures to curb the epidemic, such as China,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, New Zealand and Singapore
[25]. Travel bans have led to a delay of importation into
Australia [26]. Entry and exit screening, quarantine for
14 days, and increasingly testing is being used to identify
imported cases and prevent onward transmission [27].
Although SARS spread to 26 countries, the vast major-
ity of cases were concentrated in five countries or
regions: China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and To-
ronto, Canada. Cluster effect and superspreading events
were well described, but community transmission only
occurred to a larger extent in China—all other countries
had minimal community transmission, and the majority
of transmission occurred within hospitals. Through
rigorous public health measures such as prompt institu-
tional isolation of all cases, contact tracing and quaran-
tine (with legal monitoring) for 14 days of all contacts,
and personal protective measures in hospitals, SARS was
effectively eradicated. Although travel warnings were is-
sued, no lockdowns were implemented except in China.
Most of the outbreaks were nosocomial.
With regards to MERS, Saudi Arabia (KSA) so far has
carried the greatest brunt of MERS-CoV since its emer-
gence, with 85% of the total global reported cases being
either diagnosed or originating in KSA, with a total of
1897 cases and 734 fatalities. The second major outbreak
was due to exportation of MERS from Saudi Arabia via a
business traveler to South Korea resulting in an explo-
sive but in the end contained outbreak in 2015 [28]. Les-
sons learned from the MERS outbreak were the
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foundation of Korea’s enhanced pandemic preparedness
plans which enabled the country to successfully curb the
COVID-19 outbreak in Korea in early 2020.
Ebola
Ebola was declared a public health emergency in 2014 in
West Africa, and again in 2018 in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo [6, 29]. In the pantheon of emerging in-
fectious diseases, Ebola virus stands out as one of the
deadliest. The Zaire species of Ebola kills somewhere be-
tween 40 to 90% of its victims, and usually upwards of
60% of infected people die [30]. Only a handful of infec-
tious diseases can claim such high death rates, including
rabies [31, 32], pneumonic plague, and inhalational an-
thrax [33]. About 14,000 deaths due to Ebola were re-
corded in 2014. Why did the Ebola outbreak result in a
much lower death toll compared to COVID-19? One
major difference between Ebola and COVID-19 is the
mode and timing of transmission. Ebola is spread during
the last stage of the disease through bodily fluids. Expos-
ure of infected individuals to a high-density population
could result in a catastrophic outbreak, however, overall
the R0 is far lower than that of COVID-19 as transmis-
sion depends on closer proximity between humans, in
particular contact to bodily fluids. Those persons who
are at greatest risk for Ebola infection are those who
have very close contact taking care of the sick, bedridden
victims, regardless whether they are in the home or the
hospital. Rapid patient identification, isolation and ag-
gressive follow up is shown to rapidly limit the potential
for disease spread. Isolation of Ebola cases is successful
because of the absence of pre-symptomatic shedding, eg
the virus only or mainly spreads when the victim has
symptoms. Transmission can also occur because of res-
ervoirs of the virus in survivors in their eyes or semen.
The world’s second largest Ebola outbreak occurred in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2018 and
led to a second declaration of a public health emergency
in 2019. The public health emergency was declared over
on 25 June 2020. The nearly two year-long outbreak was
particularly challenging because it took place in an active
conflict zone. Led by the Government and the Ministry
of Health of DRC and supported by WHO and partners,
the response involved training thousands of health
workers, registering 250,000 contacts, testing 220,000
samples, providing patients with equitable access to ad-
vanced therapeutics, vaccinating over 303,000 people
with the highly effective Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV-
GP vaccine) [34, 35], and offering care for all survivors
after their recovery. The response was bolstered by the
engagement and leadership of the affected communities
[36]. By July 2020, a total of 3481 cases (3323 confirmed,
158 probable) with 2299 deaths had been reported [36].
Geographic spread of Ebola via air travel
Spread of Ebola occurred mainly via land border cross-
ings between West African countries in 2014. Spread via
air travel has only rarely occurred, the main reason being
that Ebola patients are so sick that they cannot board a
plane or are picked up at entry screening. However,
since Ebola has an incubation period of up to 21 days,
carriers could arrive in a country weeks before symp-
toms develop – potentially transmitting it to the people
they know. Eleven Ebola cases were reported in the US
in 2014, of which seven cases were medically evacuated
from other countries. Nine of the people contracted the
disease outside the US and traveled into the country, ei-
ther as regular airline passengers or as medical evacuees;
of those nine, two died. Two people contracted Ebola in
the United States. Both were nurses who treated an
Ebola patient; both recovered. In 2014 some US state
governors signed an order authorizing the mandatory
quarantine for 21 days of anyone, even if asymptomatic,
who had direct contact with Ebola patients, over and be-
yond the CDC’s voluntary quarantine.
Based on epidemic conditions and international flight
restrictions to and from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone as of Sept 2014, models projected 2.8 travellers
infected with Ebola virus departing the above three
countries via commercial flights, on average, every
month. 91,547 (64%) of all air travellers departing
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had expected destina-
tions in low-income and lower-middle-income countries
[37]. Screening international travellers departing three
airports would enable health assessments of all travellers
at highest risk of exposure to Ebola virus infection. For
the Kivu outbreak in DRC in 2018, studies showed little
commercial airline connectivity from the Ebola-affected
area; however, larger cities in DRC and throughout East
Africa should be aware of the potential for Ebola virus
importation through this route [38]. Due to limited air
travel from the DRC, the outbreak did not spread glo-
bally [38].
H1N1 influenza
Influenza attack rates vary by season, by geographic lo-
cation, by setting (eg closed settings versus community
settings), by predominant subtype and by age group. In-
fluenza outbreaks have been described in hospitals,
aboard cruise ships [39] and on airplanes [40]. H1N1
preceded the PHEIC declaration of Zika, and was the
cause of the 2009 pandemic. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic
strain possessed a unique combination of gene segments
including genes that originated from swine, avian and
human influenza viruses that had been circulating
among pigs in North America and Europe [41]. The age
and mortality risks for the H1N1 influenza pandemic
were different to the current COVID-19 pandemic, with
Wilder-Smith Tropical Diseases, Travel Medicine and Vaccines             (2021) 7:3 Page 3 of 11
younger persons affected but an overall much lower case
fatality rate than COVID-19. The epidemic was focused
in children, with an effective reproduction number of
approximately 1.2–1.3 [30] compared to 2.5 to 3.2 for
SARS-CoV-2 [11]. During 2009, the first year after the
emergence of the virus, an estimated 62 million illnesses,
274,000 hospitalizations, and 12,400 deaths associated
with the 2009 H1N1 virus occurred in the United States
[30]. The highest attack rates were in children younger
than 5 years of age, and 90% of estimated deaths oc-
curred in persons younger than 65 years of age. In one
estimate, the mean age among persons whose deaths
were attributed to H1N1 was 37 years, compared to a
mean age of 76 years among deaths attributed to sea-
sonal influenza. While vaccine was delivered relatively
late, it was demonstrated to be effective. Excess deaths
attributed to influenza varied from 3300 deaths to 48,
000 deaths [30]. FluNet is the main tool for information
sharing among the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance
Network, as well as the public. It allows 112 WHO Na-
tional Influenza Centers in 83 countries access to remote
data entry [42].
Geographic spread of influenza, in particular H1N1, via air
travel
The role of air travel in the global spread of influenza
has been the subject of a significant body of research.
H1N1 spread rapidly according to air travel patterns first
from Mexico to the United States and then around the
globe during the initial wavefront of this epidemic [43].
The speed and direction of spread is directly correlated
with air passengers volumes and destinations of the ma-
jority of flights. Given the short incubation time, isola-
tion and quarantine is much less effective compared to
diseases with a longer incubation time such as SARS and
COVID-19. Regarding air travel, the main route con-
nected to the influenza source area should be targeted
for travel restrictions. Imposing a 99% air travel restric-
tion delays the epidemic peak by up to 2 weeks [44].
Simulation modelling for the 1998–1999 through 2000–
2001 influenza seasons using a standard compartmental
model coupled with air transportation data showed that
air travel plays an important role in the spread of annual
influenza within the U.S., particularly in cities with large
air travel volumes [45]. Combination strategies can delay
spread, reduce overall number of cases, and delay and
reduce peak attack rate more than individual strategies
[46]. However, antivirals and hospitalization were found
to be more effective on attack rate reductions than travel
restrictions. Combined strategies (with 99% restriction
on all transport modes) deferred the peak for long
enough to establish a vaccination program [44].
A stochastic discrete event simulation model assessed
the effectiveness of passenger screening at US airports
[47]. Modelling of US airport screening would identify
50% infected individuals; efficacy is limited because of
asymptomatically infected passengers. Screening would
not significantly delay arrival of pandemic influenza via
international air transport but could reduce the rate of
new US cases and subsequent deaths. Implementation of
entry screening policies was associated with on average
additional 7–12 day delays in local transmission com-
pared to nations that did not implement entry screening,
with lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals consist-
ent with no additional delays and upper bounds extend-
ing to 20–30 day additional delays [48]. The resources
required for implementation should be balanced against
the expected benefits of entry screening. A study in
China during May–November 2009 analysing the effect-
iveness of border entry screening and holiday-related
school closures, age distribution and transmission dy-
namic characteristics were similar to those in Northern
Hemisphere temperate countries. The 8 days of national
holidays in October reduced the effective reproduction
number by 37% (95% credible interval 28–45%) [49]. Re-
strictions on air travel are projected to be of “surpris-
ingly little value in delaying epidemics, unless almost all
travel ceases very soon after epidemics are detected.” In-
terventions to reduce local transmission of influenza are
likely to be more effective at reducing the rate of global
spread [50].
Measles
Measles is one of the most transmissible viral infections
that although mild in most cases, can cause serious ill-
ness, life-long complications and death [51]. Measles is
transmitted from human to human via respiratory
droplets, and is associated with the world’s highest
reproduction number of more than 10 [30], far higher
than that of SARS-CoV-2. Strebel in “Plotkin’s Vaccines”
reports that the case fatality ratio is high in children
aged < 1 year, lower in children aged 1–9 years, and then
rises again in teenagers and adults [30]. In industrialized
countries, death occurs in 1–3 out of 1000 cases. Mea-
sles runs a more devastating course in children in devel-
oping countries or in settings with minimal care where
measles mortality rates can be as high as 2 to 15% [30].
Before vaccine introduction, measles affected over 90%
of children globally by the age of 15 [52]. Effectiveness
of the measles vaccine after two doses is as high as 97%
[53]. Given such an efficacious vaccine, in 2012, the
World Health Assembly set the objective of eliminating
measles in four of the six World Health Organization
(WHO) regions by 2015 and in five regions by 2020
[54]. Countries in all six WHO regions have adopted
goals for measles elimination by 2020. Indeed, during
2000–2017 annual reported measles incidence decreased
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83% because of vaccination campaigns and childhood
vaccination programmes, from 145 to 25 cases per mil-
lion population; and annual estimated measles deaths
decreased 80%, from 545,174 to 109,638 [52].
The declaration of measles elimination from the
Americas in 1999 was a historic milestone, as the first
WHO region to eliminate measles [55]. However, in
2018, the Americas saw a major resurgence, mainly be-
cause of the migration crisis in Venezuela [56, 57], com-
bined with decreasing vaccine coverage that increased
the vulnerability to importation of measles [58]. The ex-
tent of the current outbreak is a setback to the WHO’s
global measles elimination goals. In 1998, the European
Region WHO set a target to eliminate measles and ru-
bella by 2010 [59], which was not achieved. In 2018,
Europe saw a major resurgence of measles; the total
number of measles cases in 2018 was the highest in this
decade, reaching three times the total cases in 2017 [60].
In 2018, Europe reported more than 21,000 cases of
measles, including 35 deaths [61]. Early reports in 2019
show a further 300% increase [62]. Of note, social dis-
tancing and lockdown measures during 2020 resulted in
a major decline of measles [63].
As there is no animal reservoir for measles, measles
resurgence is due to human movement of viraemic per-
sons [61]. Some attribute the enormous migration into
Europe in the past 5 years fas the reason for the measles
resurgence in this region [64–66]. Indeed, infectious dis-
eases in migrants including measles are well documented
[55, 67–71]. Travelers and pilgrims also play a role in
disease propagation, including adoption from measles-
endemic countries [72–74]: However, the main reason
for the resurgence of measles globally is vaccine hesi-
tancy leading to suboptimal vaccine coverage rates [75].
In the year 2020, measles vaccine coverage rates dropped
further due to the COVID-19 pandemic as lock-downs
interrupted routine immunization programmes and a
further resurgence of measles is expected in the years to
come [76]. The colliding epidemics of COVID-19, mea-
sles and Ebola in DRC are of particular concern [77].
Geographic spread of measles via travel
Measles is often not considered a risk for travellers, and
hence pre-travel advice often does not include measles
vaccination [71, 78]. In a study among returned Austra-
lian travellers, only 1 of 25 imported cases reported
seeking pre-travel health advice and few had perceived
measles as a travel-associated disease [79]. Measles was
also highlighted as a high risk for amplification during
the Hajj pilgrimage [74, 80]. While there are reports of
measles importations resulting from international adop-
tions and humanitarian entrants, the majority of inter-
national travel and subsequently, the majority of
importations of measles are in short-term travellers [81].
Large, sustained outbreaks in countries with sub-optimal
immunisation coverage, such as many countries in Eur-
ope, result in regular incursions by travellers into regions
that have eliminated measles, some resulting in local
outbreaks.
Migrants are often unfairly blamed for the spread of
measles. However, the estimated seroprevalence of mea-
sles IgG antibodies of 80–88% among recent migrants
from the WHO African region [66], while sub-optimal,
these rates are greater than WHO coverage estimates
from the region and on par with coverage reported in
some European receiving countries. Despite record num-
bers of migrants arriving in Europe, the contribution of
migration on the current epidemiology of measles in
Europe is minimal [55]. However, immigrants from
within and outside Europe are a growing population
group and face barriers to accessing immunisation and
other health services and strategies to reach migrant
populations and provide catch-up immunisation are
needed [55].
Poliomyelitis
Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative was estab-
lished in 1988, two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV)
serotypes (types 2 and 3) have been eradicated. Trans-
mission of WPV type 1 (WPV1) remains uninterrupted
only in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the case fa-
tality rate is very low, the resulting life-long disabilities.
Poliomyelitis was the leading cause of permanent disabil-
ity in children in the pre-vaccine era. In 1988, when the
global eradication target was adopted, approximately
350,000 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis were occurring
annually. In 2019, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported the
highest number of WPV1 cases (176) since 2014. During
January 1–March 31, 2020 (as of June 19), 54 WPV1
cases were reported, an approximate fourfold increase
from 12 cases during the corresponding period in 2019
[82]. Paralytic poliomyelitis can also be caused by circu-
lating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV), which
emerges when attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)
virus reverts to neurovirulence following prolonged
circulation in under-immunized populations. Since the
global withdrawal of type 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in
April 2016, cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks have in-
creased in number and geographic extent. During
January 2018–March 2020, 21 countries reported 547
cVDPV2 cases [82]. The COVID-19) pandemic and
lockdowns have resulted in suspension of immunization
activities and disruptions to poliovirus surveillance in
2020.
Geographic spread of polio via travel
Poliomyelitis is a rare disease on a global scale, and
hence spread via travel is rare. That said, the endgame
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of polio eradication is hampered by the international
spread of poliovirus via travelers [83]. In response to
ongoing importations of poliovirus into polio-free
countries, on 5 May 2014, WHO declared the inter-
national spread of wild poliovirus a public health
emergency of international concern. Unbeknown to
many, polio is still a public health emergency of
international concern.
In a modelling study on the risk of exportation of
poliomyelitis, immunization coverage rates, infectious
period, the asymptomatic-to-symptomatic ratio, and also
the probability of a traveler being infectious at the time
of travel were considered [83]. The model estimated 665
polio exportations (> 99% of which were asymptomatic)
from nine polio-infected countries in 2014, of which
78.3% originated from Pakistan [83]. This model also es-
timated 21 importations of poliovirus into Saudi Arabia
via Hajj pilgrims and 20 poliovirus infections imported
to India in the same year. For countries that are vulner-
able to polio outbreaks due to poor national polio
immunization coverage rates, this model may help guide
policy makers to decide whether imposing an entry re-
quirement in terms of proof of vaccination against polio
would be justified, as India did for Pakistan when India
was declared polio-free.
Monkeypox and smallpox
The identification of monkeypox imported in two separ-
ate travelers to the United Kingdom with one onward
transmission to a health care worker in 2019 raised
media and political attention on an emerging public
health threat [84]. In the same year, Nigeria experienced
an unusual outbreak of monkeypox, after the case was
confirmed in 1978. As of 13th October 2018, there have
been one hundred and sixteen confirmed cases the ma-
jority of whom are under the age of 40 years [84]. First
identified in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
in 1970, monkeypox has since 2010 expanded to cause
outbreaks among humans in at least seven additional Af-
rican countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
and South Sudan [85] Major knowledge gaps remain on
the epidemiology, host reservoir, and emergence, trans-
mission, pathogenesis and prevention of monkeypox.
Vaccine development against monkeypox is ongoing
[86]. While monkeypox is currently not a global threat,
many lessons can be learned from its “cousin” virus
smallpox on the need for international cooperation and
a well-funded global vaccination programme was needed
to eradicate a disease [87]. It is estimated that over 70%
of the world’s population is no longer protected against
smallpox, and through cross-immunity, and therefore
also not to monkeypox.
Geographic spread of monkeypox via travel
The importations to the UK and an importation to Israel
represent the first-time international travellers have been
implicated in the spread of monkeypox outside of an
outbreak setting [50]. In 2003, US several human mon-
keypox cases traced to virus exposure via infected cap-
tive prairie dogs were reported [88]. The virus was likely
introduced through a shipment of imported African ro-
dents, which were kept with other mammals, including
prairie dogs, in a pet distribution facility in the Midwest.
To prevent further monkeypox virus introduction, im-
portation of African rodents was restricted and restric-
tions were introduced on domestic trade or movement
of prairie dogs and certain other rodents.
Emerging arboviruses
Arthropod-borne viruses (arboviruses) have a long his-
tory of emerging to infect humans, but during recent de-
cades, they have been spreading more effectively with
widening of the geographic distribution, and increasing
magnitude and frequency of outbreaks [89]. This is due
to several factors, including increased air travel, climate
change [90] and population growth including
urbanization [91]. Urbanization is particularly important
for the re-emergence of dengue, whereby humans living
in close proximity become the amplification hosts and
peri-domestic mosquitoes, mainly Aedes aegypti, mediate
human-to-human transmission. Dengue, yellow fever,
chikungunya, and Zika viruses have undergone such
urban emergence. Emergence can involve simple spill-
over from enzootic (wildlife) cycles, as in the case of
West Nile virus accompanying geographic expansion
into the Americas, and recently also increasingly in
Europe [92]; secondary amplification in domesticated
animals, as seen with Japanese encephalitis [93],
Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and Rift Valley fever
viruses [94].
The Zika outbreak in the Americas was declared a
PHEIC in January 2016. The Zika epidemic presents the
first ever known association between a flavivirus, carried
by the Aedes aegypti mosquito, and congenital disease.
The congenital disease most closely linked to the Zika
virus in the 2015 epidemic was microcephaly where the
occipitofrontal head circumference is smaller than 98%
of all newborns, but many more neurodevelopmental
anomalies were observed [95, 96]. Mortality in adults is
extremely low. Zika was also unusual as for the first time
in history sexual transmission of a flavivirus was con-
firmed. Sexual transmission also increased the fear of
importation and subsequent forward transmission even
where the vector does not exist, and prompted WHO
and CDC to publish advice on how to reduce the risk of
sexual transmission in travelers [97]. Although Zika is
best documented for its associated with maternal
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infections and their impact on birth defects, also dengue
and chikungunya can lead to maternal complications as
well as severe infections in the neonate [98].
Dengue is the most prevalent arboviral disease, present
in more than 120 countries affecting more than 2 billion
people [99]. The most common life-threatening clinical
response to dengue infection is the dengue vascular per-
meability syndrome, epidemiologically linked to second-
ary infection, but can also occur in primary infection.
Antibody-dependent enhancement, viral factors, age,
host factors, and clinical experience of the managing
physician modulate the risk of progressing to severe
dengue. The reported relative risk of severe dengue in
secondary versus tertiary infection ranges from 2 to 7
[100]. The absolute risk of severe dengue in highly en-
demic areas in children is about 0.1% per year for pri-
mary infections, and 0.4% for secondary infections.
About 2–4% of secondary infections lead to severe den-
gue. Clinical management of severe dengue depends on
judicious use of fluid rehydration. The risk of travel-
acquired dengue depends on destination, season and
duration of travel and activities during travel. Serocon-
version rates reported in travellers therefore vary be-
tween less than 1% to more than 20% [100].
Chikungunya is associated with a low mortality, but high
morbidity with disabling arthritis that can last for
months beyond the viremic phase [101]. On the other
hand, yellow fever has the highest case fatality rate and
is therefore one of the most feared arboviral diseases
[102].
Geographic spread of arboviral diseases via travel
The spread of arboviral diseases via travelers to non-
endemic countries is well documented, and has led to
the geographic expansion including new establishment
in countries where the vector exists. The rapid geo-
graphic spread of dengue viruses globally is the result of
increasing mobility of people via modern means of
transportation [103–106]. Air travel connectivity be-
tween dengue-endemic countries and from dengue-
endemic countries to non-endemic, but still vulnerable
settings has increased exponentially [107]. Whilst
imported dengue cases to the US have resulted in small
dengue clusters for many years [108]; the first autoch-
thonous sporadic cases in Europe (France and Croatia)
were reported only in 2010 [109, 110]. In 2012, the first
major European outbreak of dengue occurred in Ma-
deira [111]. Viremic travelers to non-endemic areas
where Aedes mosquitoes exist constitute the source for
triggering autochthonous transmission [112]. About 58%
of travelers who returned to Europe after acquiring a
dengue infection during their travel to dengue-endemic
countries were viremic when seeking medical care, thus
highlighting the potential for dengue virus introduction
[113]. Fortunately, the seasonal window in Europe when
vectorial capacity is sufficient to sustain autochthonous
transmission is short [114].
A statistically significant positive association between
passenger flows via airline travel from countries experi-
encing chikungunya epidemics and the number of
imported cases in the USA at the state level [115]. This
validation study demonstrated that air travel was
strongly associated with observed importation of chikun-
gunya cases in the USA and can be a useful proxy for
identifying areas at increased risk for disease import-
ation. For the first time in history, in 2016, yellow fever
was exported from Africa to Asia [116].
Spread of arboviral diseases via air travel is mainly
driven by viremic travelers, but spread can also occur
through infected mosquitoes. Insecticide treatments in
aircraft (termed ‘aircraft disinsection’) aim to support
the containment of potentially disease-carrying vector
insects. Despite established efficacy of aircraft disinsec-
tion in trials, its effectiveness and feasibility in flight op-
erations, and its usefulness as a public health measure
need to be enhanced [117].
Stakeholders of pandemics
Numerous travel stakeholders are affected by, and affect,
pandemics. Although the key purpose of the Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHR) is to prevent unwar-
ranted interruptions to trade and travel during large
transnational infectious disease outbreaks [29], stake-
holders react in different ways depending on political
pressure, public sentiment and the media. For example,
WHO did not issue any travel restrictions for the Ebola
outbreak, yet air travel plummeted. The reasons for
interruption of travel during the 2014–16 Ebola out-
break were complex, with decisions by States only partly
contributing to the cessation. Decisions by non-state ac-
tors, particularly the travel industry itself, were major
drivers [6].
Risk of in-flight transmission
More than 1 billion passengers travel by air annually
[107]. Although this manuscript focuses on the risk of
spread via air travel, it is important to also quickly men-
tion transmission that may happen on flights. In-flight
transmission can occur especially for respiratory patho-
gens: Airborne transmission may occur through large
droplets > 5 μm that fall to the floor within a radius of 1
m and might be better called contact transmission, or
through aerosolization of an infectious agent in droplets
< 5 μm that remain airborne for a long time and can dis-
perse widely [40]. Cabin air is normally exchanged 15 to
20 times per hour, as compared with 12 times per hour
in most office buildings. Aircraft recirculates 50% of the
air to control humidity and fuel efficiency. Recirculated
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air passes through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
filters capable of removing 99.97% of particles 0.3 μm in
diameter, hence it is not the air quality but the proximity
of persons that present the greatest risk of in-flight
transmission. Precise data on airborne transmission of
infections in aircraft are scarce and imprecise, but they
suggest that risk is associated with sitting within 2 rows
of a contagious passenger for a flight time of more than
8 h [40]. This association is mainly derived from studies
of in-flight transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis
in which tuberculin skin test conversion was taken to in-
dicate infection acquired during flight. In one study, 4 of
15 passengers within 2 rows had a tuberculin skin test
conversion [40]. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, 40
flights were identified with a case of SARS on board; in-
flight transmission is thought to have taken place on 5
of these flights, infecting a total of 37 passengers [40].
As for COVID-19, in-flight transmission has been re-
ported for more than 40 flights, but the number could
be much higher as ascertainment to in-flight transmis-
sion is difficult and imprecise [118]. Wearing of face
masks will reduce the risk. During the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the airline industry has taken a pro-active ap-
proach to increase passenger safety through extended
ventilation at the gate, boarding and deplaning strategies,
improved aircraft disinfection, and pre-flight screening
such as temperature checks and COVID-19 testing
[119]. Of the other respiratory infections, the common
cold is too common for in-flight transmission to be
studied, and measles and meningococcal infection are
known to be transmitted occasionally.
Food- and water-borne transmission usually involves a
single source that transmits microbes to many people.
The most commonly reported diseases transmitted on
aircraft have been due to contaminated food. Vector-
borne transmission is actually via insects, though theor-
etically might be via vermin (as with plague rats on
ships), and aircraft disinsection is the way to address this
problem [117].
Conclusions
COVID-19 is the worst pandemic in scale and speed of
this century associated with the highest number of glo-
bal deaths, with most of the deaths reported in high in-
come countries. Risk factors such as increasing age,
obesity, and comorbidities including pulmonary diseases,
diabetes, cancer and neurological diseases drive the in-
fection fatality rate. Although the infection fatality rate is
far lower compared to other emerging infectious dis-
eases such as Ebola or yellow fever, the global toll in
terms of deaths is far higher due to its propensity of high
secondary attack rates with a high basic reproduction
number. Its rapid spread via air travel around the world
was relentless despite early travel restrictions and travel
bans. However, travel restrictions delayed the import-
ation and reduced the outbreak size. Mobility restric-
tions continue to be used across countries. Due to the
high reproduction number, combating COVID-19 will
require an all-society and all-government approach.
In contrast, travel restrictions for arboviral diseases
will be ineffective as the focus is on vector control. The
re-emergence of measles requires addressing declining
vaccine coverage rates, and will not require travel re-
strictions. Emerging infectious such as Ebola, monkey-
pox, and poliomyelitis will not benefit from travel
restrictions as the risk of spread via travel is minimal,
and effective tools in terms of vaccines are available.
H1N1 as a respiratory pathogen was spread rapidly
around the globe, even faster than COVID-19, but is as-
sociated with a much lower infection fatality rate, and
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